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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
NED C. JENSEN, WOODROW E.
HAYWARD, RAY F. CROSHAW
A. FOSS PETERSON and LOWELL
D. OSWALD,
Pia intiffs-Appella nts,
I

Case

No. I 0930

vs.

BOUNTIFUL CITY, a municipal
corporation,
Defendant-Respondent.

Respondent's Brief on Appeal
Respondent agrees with the appellants' statements as to
the kind of case, disposition in the lower court and the relief
sought on appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Respondent agrees with substantially all the appellants'
Statement of Facts except to note that the statement relating
to the question of a special meeting and the manner of filing
of the requests for removal of names is not complete and
there are other facts which ought to be stated.
The area in question is a sort of Texas-shaped tract with
an average dimension of about one-half mile, in the Southwestern part of Bountiful, the panhandle at the southerly
1

end, and bounded by other city territory on three sides (map,
Exhibit "F"). As of December 14, 1966, the date the petition
for annexation was filed with the city recorder, there were
431 owners of real property as shown by the Official Records
of the Davis County Recorder within the territory described
in the plat or map attached to the petition (R-11). The
county assessment rolls which are prepared by the county
assessor from the information provided by the county recorder showing the record owners within the area as of January 1, 1966 (17-21-22 as amended 1965), reflect that there
were 373 names on the 1966 assessment rolls (R-36). The
difference between the 431 as shown by the recorder's records as of December 14, 1966, and the 373 names as shown
by the assessment rolls as of January l, 1966, is apparently
caused by transfers after January 1, 1966, where larger
parcels were subdivided or ownerships otherwise divided.
The following summaries appear on Exhibits "G" and "H":
OWNERS OF RECORD
TOTAL
ONE-HALF
VALID SIGNATURES
REQUESTS FOR WITHDRAWAL
BALANCE IF WITHDRAWAL ALLOWED
OWNERS ON ASSESSMENT ROLLS
TOTAL
ONE-HALF
VALID SIGNATURES
REQUESTS FOR WITHDRAWAL
BALANCE IF WITHDRAWAL ALLOWED

431
215.5
243
26
217
373
186.5
199
26
173

The petition for annexation carried a majority under
either method of determining ownership except that if the
26 owners are allowed to withdraw and the assessment rolls
2

are used as the basis of determining ownership, there would
not be a required majority.
Four of the five plaintiffs were personally present at a
meeting of the city council on Wednesday December 7 1966
'
'
'
when the council decided in favor of annexing the territory
(R-12) and set the following Wednesday, December 14, 1966,
to act finally upon the annexation (R-18) and this same
date was previously fixed by the council to consider the
annual audit reports (R-16). On Wednesday, December 14,
1966, after the council had convened, conducted preliminary
business and called for action on the petition for annexation,
Mr. West presented directly to the council, not to the city
recorder, a list of 31 signatures requesting that their names
be removed from the petition for annexation. Of the 31, five
had not signed the annexation petition, leaving 26 requesting
withdrawal (R-21). The city council denied the request for
withdrawal, adopted an ordinance of annexation on December 14, 1966 (R-5), and caused the ordinance and plat to be
recorded on December 20, 1966 (R-11). Since January 1,
1967, the city has supplied city services to the annexed area
consisting of police and fire protection, street services and
garbage collection; and made preparations for supplying
electricity and other city programs to the annexed area
(R-13).
On January 31, 1967, the Complaint was filed.
ARGUMENT
Respondent replies to appellants' six points of argument
in the same order but with paraphrased headings in some
instances.
POINT I.
PLAINTIFFS RIGHT TO CHALLENGE WAS RESTRICTED IN TIME AND SUBJECT MATTER.
3

Plaintiffs as private persons cannot challenge an annexation ordinance after it takes effect, and any challenge thereafter is limited to jurisdictioned matters.
The Annexation Ordinance was dated December 14
1966, and recorded together with a plat in the office of th~
Davis County Recorder on December 20, 1966, whereupon
the annexation was completed. The action in this cause was
filed on January 31, 1967, more than 30 days after the effective date of the ordinance.
The appellants rely on rule 65B(d) U.R.C.P. as giving
the appellants a right to commence a suit where the Attorney General fails, after notice, to bring suit for relief allowable under rule 65B(b) (1); however, the latter provision
does not mention any right of action against a city, and particularly no right to a collateral attack upon the corporate
boundaries.
Most courts hold that a private person, if he has any
standing to challenge an annexation at all, must do so before
the ordinance takes effect and his suit is to prevent any
action which would result in allowing the ordinance to become effective, whereas after the effective date of the ordinance, the only one having the right to challenge is the
Attorney General. It was held in Colquhoun vs. City of
Tucson, et al., 55 Ariz. 451, 103 P.2d 269, that where the rec·
ord of annexation appears to be a valid proceeding on its
face, only the Attorney General or the County Attorney may
question the validity of an annexation of territory to the city;
although, where a proceeding is invalid on its face and before completion thereof, a private individual may bring suit
to prevent the completion of an attempt to change the
boundaries of the municipality for lack of jurisdiction.
A more recent Arizona case, Burton vs. City of Tucson,
88 Ariz. 320, 356 P.2d 413, held that a citizen may not attack
4

an annexation ordinance after the same is complete but may
enjoin the city during the process of annexation where it is
alleged that the city lacks jurisdiction of the property. This
was also a case where the ordinance was an emergency measure and was not published, but the court held that it became
effective upon passage, even before the expiration of 30 days,
without publication, as an emergency measure.
Colorado, in the case of Griffin vs. City of Canon, 362
P.2d 200 (1961), held that where Canon City annexed a town
of Canon under a statutory proceeding, and after ordinances
pursuant thereto were enacted, a private person had no
standing to challenge the validity of the ordinance. The court
cites 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations, Section 66, page 177,
in support of its holding, that unless the proceedings are
wholly void for want of authority or jurisdiction, their validity is not subject to collateral attack; hence, where even a de
facto, not a de jure, municipal corporation is established, it
may be challenged only through the Attorney General. Section 66 of C.J.S. further states that unless the proceedings
are absolutely void for want of authority or jurisdiction their
validity is not subject to collateral attack and the informalities or irregularities such as sufficiency of description, lack
of hearing, are merely collateral.
Also to this effect are 37 Am. Jur., page 649, and the
'
Supplement on Municipal Corporations, Section 32. We quote
from the Supplement, Section 32, as follows:
"While there is some authority to the contrary, the
view generally taken is that where proceedings altering municipal boundaries have been carried to completion by public officials having jurisdiction of the
subject matter, and acting under at least colorable
authority, their irregularities in procedure will not
clothe a private individual with capacity to attack
collaterally such boundary changes. In some cases,
5

in_ apparent conformity with this rule, the courts
without differentiating between a direct and a colla~
teral attack, have held or indicate that a private
party has no capacity to attack the fixing or extension of municipal limits. The general rule is based
upon public policy and while it would appear to be
in opposition to established legal or equitable principles in that a private party is seemingly without
remedy for what may be a private wrong, neverthe·
less the feeling is that at least a de facto corporation
is formed embracing the new territory, and to allow a
private attack against the existence of such a municipality would result in undesirable consequences to
the public welfare."
The foregoing Am. Jur. citation was referred to in support
of the decision of Dixon vs. City of Bremerton, et al., 25
Wash. 2d 508, 171 P.2d 243, wherein it was stated that Washington follows the general rule as announced in Am. Jur. and
that any holdings to the contrary are the minority rule.
The extension of corporate boundaries has been held to
be a legislative and ministerial function and not a judicial
function. Plutus Mining vs. Orme, 76 Utah 286, 289 P. 132,
holds that the creation of a city and fixing of territorial limits
is essentially a legislative and not a judicial function (citing
19 Utah 368). Public policy requires that city boundaries be
certain and definite at all times, not only for local administrative, but for tax purposes. This holding was followed in
Re Town of West Jordan, 7 Utah 2d 391, 326P.2d105, which
distinguished the changing of the territorial limits of a municipal corporation as primarily a legislative and not a judicial
function, from the disconnection of lands under 10-4-1 and
2 U.C.A., 1953, as a judicial function.
California decisions hold that the determination by a
city council of the number of qualified owners signing a petition for annexation is not a judicial act and being a mere
6

ministerial act, it cannot be questioned in a court proceeding,
Gardner vs. Tugunga, 140 Cal. App. 351, 35 P2d 562, and
407 P.2d 325.
A recent Kansas case decided December 2, 1966, Babcock vs. Kansas City, et al., 197 Kan. 610, 419 P.2d 882, held,
in effect, that the many previous decisions of Kansas which
have never permitted a private individual to bring an action
attacking the legality of the corporate existence of the city
including the extension of the corporate limits, had not been
changed by a change in procedure which allowed a suit by
a private person attacking an adverse resolution or ordinance. The right to attack the corporate entity or existence
cannot be modified by such a procedural change.
The relief provided by Rule 65B U.R.C.P. is limited to
instances "where no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy exists ... " The plaintiffs, in this instance, had a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in that they could have
challenged the annexation ordinance before the same became
effective and complete. The ordinance provided that it was
to become effective the day after its first publication and its
first publication was Friday, December 16, 1966, and it was
not recorded until December 20, 1966. It would have been
possible for an action to be commenced anytime between
December 14 and December 20, 1966. Also, if the plaintiffs
had in mind withdrawing their names after December 7,
1966, they could have tendered the withdrawal earlier and
commenced suit any time after December 7, 1966. Furthermore, assuming that the emergency provision should not
have been allowed, suit could have been brought within the
30 day period, but the plaintiffs failed to avail themselves of
this remedy. The case of State vs. Ryan, 41 Utah 327, 125
P. 666, cited by appellants, was one in which Murdock and
others obtained leave from the district court to file an information in the nature of quo warranto to test the validity of
7

the organization of Wasatch High School District. Murdock
would have had a right to maintain an action in the nature
of an election contest as to whether or not certain votes were
legally cast without asking leave from anyone, but the time
for bringing the action had past. The court stated at
page 336,
"It was, however, a remedy which the respondent
could have invoked, and thus, instead of seeking to
dissolve a public corporation he could have prevented
its organization, and would thus not have been required to intermeddle with or assail any rights because none would have then have existed."

The court, at page 335, quotes with approval the following:
"Private individuals who have no interest other than
as citizens, residents, and taxpayers of a municipal
corporation cannot maintain an action of quo warranto against such corporation."
The court further stated that the interest of a resident and
taxpayer within the school district is not such an interest as
will authorize an action quo warranto to test the validity
of a public corporation, although, such corporation is only a
school district with limited and defined powers. The court
says that such corporation is, nevertheless, one that is
created by the laws of this State and is an arm of the State
through which the State Government, to some extent at
least, is benefitted. Under comment 4 on page 336, the court
said that a private individual has no right to rush into the
courts of the State to ask to dissolve a governmental agency.
The remedies of contesting the election and for quo warranto may be cumulative only where a private individual has
a special interest. At the bottom of page 338, the court states,
"Our statutes, however, does not permit, nor can the
courts of this State allow, a citizen to interfere with
8

the state agencies without showing that he has some
special interest which requires protection."
The court stated that the lower court should have sustained
the demurrer.
Rule 65B(d) should be viewed as granting a private
person a procedural right where he also has a substantive
right to bring the particular action. The foregoing cases
indicate that no substantive right exists in favor of a private
person to attack an annexation ordinance. To hold otherwise would make it possible for several separate suits by a
number of private persons at varying times to attack the
corporate boundaries, whereas, if only the Attorney General
has the right to sue in such cases, his suit is binding upon all
concerned.
POINT II
ELIGIBILITY TO SIGN AS OWNER A PETITION
FOR ANNEXATION rs TO BE DETERMINED
FROM THE RECORDS OF THE COUNTY RECORDER AS OF THE DATE OF FILING THE
PETITION.
The statutory provision relating to annexation of contiguous territory, 10-3-1 U.C.A., 1953, as amended in 1957,
is set forth in appellants brief, page 8. Prior to the 1957
Amendment, 10-3-1, did not contain the phrase "and the
owne1·s of not less than one-third in value of the real property, as shown by the last assessment rolls." Thus prior to
the 1957 Amendment all that was necessary was that a
majority of the owners of real property in the territory
lying contiguous to the corporate limits sign such a petition.
The subsequent addition of the 'phrase "and the owners
of not less than one-third in value of the real property
shown by the last assessment rolls" was to assure that the
majority also represented a substantial value of property
being annexed and it appeared to the legislators that to avoid
9

other proof of value, a reference could be made to the assessment rolls for the purpose of determining value, only. Since
a person who acquires his property after January 1 is not
placed on the assessment rolls until the following year, the
other interpretation would be totally unfair in that a person
who had acquired his property after January 1 would not be
an eligible signer if he were required to be on the assessment
rolls, whereas, the person who sold the property to him and
having no further interest therein, would be a proper person
to sign as petitioner. The parenthetical phrase, "as shown by
the last assessment rolls", appears to be limited only to the
question of the value of the real property by mechanical construction of the statute, if not the fair intent thereof. It
would be unreasonable and unfair to interpret the statute
in such a manner that a subdivider contiguous to a city could
subdivide his county land and sell all of the lots during one
year, and before January 1st of the following year, file a
petition for annexation of the subdivision to the contiguous
city, in which event, although he had no further interest in
the subdivision or lots, he could cause the lots to be annexed
and the persons then owning and in possession would be
powerless to act.
The proper construction of the word "owner" is set
forth in the case, in Re City of Smithfield, 70 Utah 564, 262
P. 105, (1927). In a suit for disconnection in determining
whether a majority of the owners signed for disconnection,
the court said:
"As title and rights to real property vary from absolute and unqualified fee simple to that of mere oc·
cupant, so the word 'ownership' varies. in its signi,:
ficance, according to the context and subJect matter.
"The word 'owner' as used in statute, is given the
widest variety of construction, usually guided in some
measure by the object sought to be accomplished tn
10

the particular instance. It has led some courts to
declare that the word has no precise legal signification, and may be applied to any defined interest in
real estate."
The legislative intent is to be analyzed in the light of
its history, background and purpose sought to be accomplished. (Sjostrom vs. Bishop 15 Utah 2d 373). Accordingly, the
incident which brought about this 1957 amendment requiring
one-third valuation to be represented, was the annexation
by North Salt Lake on April 21, 1952, wherein the Town
which had about 480 acres when organized, sought to annex
an additional area of over 3,440 acres including some valuable industrial sites such as Standard Oil of California's Salt
Lake Refining Company which itself contained 468 acres.
On August 7, 1952, the first suit for disconnection was filed
but failed for jurisdictional reasons (Howard vs. Town of
North Salt Lake, 3 Utah 2d 189, 281 P.2d 216) and a subsequent suit, 7 Utah 2d 278, 323 P.2d 261, decided March 28,
1958, upheld the disconnection of part of such annexed land
because the disconnected portion represented 61 % of the
total valuation of the town prior to the disconnection and
could be provided no benefits to off-set the burdens, and as
such, it was held to be inequitable and unjust to allow annexation primarily for tax revenues. It was this circumstance
that stimulated legislation to require representation of at
least one-third valuation. Since valuation is a relative matter,
the legislature removed the uncertainty of the method of
evaluation by tying it to the assessed valuations which have
a direct relation to tax burdens. There was no expressed or
implied difficulty before the amendment to determine the
question as to who is an owner for purposes of signing a petition. If the definition of "owner" was a purpose of the
statute it would seem that the legislature would also have
'
inserted a similar provision in 10-4-1 defining an "owner"
11

for purposes of disconnection procedures, but the latter
statute remains as before requiring only a "majority of real
property owners" to sign, with no further definition.
From the foregoing analysis it would appear clearly to
be the legislative intent that "owner" for purposes of annexation or disconnection is defined as stated in Re City of Smithfield, supra, in a practical manner to give the party who is
concerned as owner of a beneficial interest in the land the
right to vote for its annexation. This position is supported
by some important rules of statutory construction contained
in many cases including Utah cases which are consistent with
respondent's contention that the phrase "as shown by the
last assessment rolls" modifies only the phrase "the owners
of not less than one-third in value of the real property". The
general statement of the rule is that relative or qualifying
words are to be applied to the words immediately preceding
or following, unless a legislative intent is indicated that a
different application be made.
(a) A Washington decision which is representative of
many cases before and after is that of APPLICATION OF
ANDY 302 P. 2d 963, 49 Wash. 2d 449. The court reaffirmed
the following rule as it applies to a summary of the facts
hereinafter stated:
"When a contrary intention does not appear in a
statute, relative and qualifying words and phrases,
both grammatically and legally refer to the last
antecedent. The last antecedent is the last word
which can be made an antecedent without impairing
the meaning of the sentence. . . . In this instance,
the last antecedent is the word 'reservation'."
The facts in that case involved an Indian who was convicted
in state courts for burglary where the act was committed

12

within the Indian reservation but upon land owned by a nonIndian. Federal jurisdiction was exclusive in "Indian Country" which is defined as
"(a) All land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United St.ate
Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any
patent.... "
The court held that grammatically and legally the underlined portion modified "reservation" and not "land'" hence
'
,
the Indian on the non-Indian land within the reservation was
subject to federal, not state jurisdiction; whereas if it modified "land", the non-Indian land would not have been under
the jurisdiction of the United States Government.
(b) State vs. Navaro, 83 Utah 6, 26 P.2d 955. The court
announced the rule in this case to be:
"By the Rules of Construction the relative or qualifying words are to be applied to the words immediately preceding or following, unless the legislative intent
is indicated that a different application be made.
(cites 59 C.J. 985)."
A statute before amendment read:

" ... nova caine, flowering tops and leaves, extracts,
tinctures, and other narcotic preparations of hemp
or loco weed (cannabis sativa, indian hemp), I
mariguana / or chloral hydrate or any of the
salts, derivatives, or compounds of the foregoing substances.... "
The 1927 amendment inserted the word "mariguana", following the parenthetical phrase (cannabis sativa, indian hemp)
and it was held that the underlined phrase did not modify
or apply to mariguana. If the phrase had applied to mariguana the defendant contended that he could not be guilty
unless he had possession of the mariguana plant or weed in13

stead of just the cigarettes which he had. It was held that
the underlined phrase modified or applied to "hemp or loco
weed", only.
(c) The following California cases support the rule that
a limiting clause in a statute is to be confined to the last antecedent, unless the context or the evident meaning of the
statue requires a different construction. Elbert, Limited vs.
Gross, 260 P.2d 35, 41 C.2d 322; People vs. Ortiz, 195 P.2d
82, 86 C.A.2d Supp. 937.
Some other rules of statutory construction that are
helpful are the following:
(1) The primary rule of construction of a statute is to
ascertain and declare the intention of the legislature and to
carry such intention into effect; Allen vs. Board of Education, 236 P.2d 756, 120 Utah 556; Rogers vs. Wagstaff, 232
P.2d 766, 120 Utah 136;
(2) With respect to the meaning of statutes, it is appropriate to look to the intended purpose and to the means of
accomplishing it by proper application of the language used.
Andrus vs. Allred, 17 Utah 2d 106, 404, P.2d 972; State
Land Board vs. State Department of Fish and Game, 17
Utah 2d 237, 408 P.2d 707.
(3) Where legislative intent is not clear and a literal
interpretation of language of statute gives an absurd result,
the court may search the enactment for further indications
of legislative intent by examination of wording of the act or
consideration of the underlying purposes. The intention of
the lawmaker will prevail over literal sense of terms, and,
when words are not explicit, the intention is to be collected
from the context, from the occasion and necessity of the law
and the remedy in view, and the intention is to be taken or
14

presumed according to what is consonant with reason and
good discretion. Rowley vs. Public Service Commission, 185
P.2d 514, 112 Utah 116.
Ownership of property is better determined from the
records of the county recorder than from the assessment
rolls. In any matter relating to title or right to deal with an
interest in real property, the practice of all attorneys, abstractors or knowledgeable persons dealing with land is to
search the records of the county recorder to determine the
ownership or right to deal in the land. The assessment rolls
are the proper records to search for current proportionate
valuation and then to determine against whom the assessment was made. The assessment rolls are the properly referred to in determining the question as to who are "such
qualified electors as shall have paid a property tax". The
case of Thompson vs. City of Centerville, cited by the appellants also refers to record owners in the sentence following
the one quoted by the plaintiff as follows:
"This, since any such payment inures to the benefit
of the record owner,-who is the one against whom
and whose property the government would move to
satisfy any tax obligation,-not a wife, conditional
sales vendee, mortgagee, mechanic lien claimant, ... "
Thus the Thompson case refers to "legal owners of real
property" and "record owners" and indicates that a wife by
her statutory dower has no present interest in her husband's
property. The reference to the official assessment and tax
rolls was only to determine who was entitled a credit for
having paid the property tax.
POINT III.
THE REQUESTED WITHDRAWAL BY 26 PERSONS WAS UNTIMELY AND WAS PROPERLY
REFUSED.
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Most courts hold that there is no right of a person to
withdraw his name from a petition for annexation after
it has been filed with the officer authorized to receive the
same for filing. While there are many courts who have indicated the right of withdrawal in other types of petitions,
for referendum, improvement districts and the like, even in
these instances, the courts hold that the right to withdraw is
never allowed once action has been taken upon the petition.
In the case of State vs. City of Phoenix, 74 Ariz 46,
243 P2d 766, the court stated under comment 5:
"In the instant case when the city council had regularly convened to consider the annexation ordinance
and vote upon it, the wheels of legislative action were
set in motion and jurisdiction had attached so that
the time for withdrawing of signatures had expired."
The Arizona Court referred to an exhaustive annotation in
126 A.L.R. 1031, which annotation deals with withdrawals
of petitions generally, but cites only two cases in the entire
50 page annotation which relate to petitions for annexation
and in both instances, the court held that with respect to a
petition for annexation, names could not be withdrawn. The
first annexation case is cited at page 1034 of the annotation,
Denny vs. Bellevue (1908), 18 Pa Dist R 839, stated as a
conclusion of law that
"Petitioners who had signed the petition (to admit or
annex certain land to a borrough) could not there·
after withdraw their names without the consent of
all other signers and the consent of the borrough .. ·"
"It seems clear that they affix their names to a petition, as in this case, for a specific purpose, they enter
into a contractual relation, not only with the body
to which the petition is addressed, but to each other.
The fact that one person will sign influences others
to do so, or that one had signed is a moving cause for
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others to follow as example, relying on his judgment
and discretion ... "
A Pennsylvania case annotated at page 1071 shows a deci-

sion of a county court which allowed the petitioners for
the incorporation of area of the borrough to withdraw their
signatures upon leave of the court. It is to be noted that both
of these cases were decided in 1908 in Pennsylvania, the
former in the district court and the latter in the county
court. Another case on annexation cited at page 1038, in Re
McLeod (1904), 4 Ont. Week Rep. 26, held that persons
signing a petition filed with a municipal council requesting
annexation of the municipality in question to an adjacent
municipality were not at liberty to withdraw their signatures
in the absence of showing that their signatures were obtained by fraud or bad faith. California, in the case of Rogers vs.
Pasadena, held that the electors who signed a petition for
annexation of certain territory to the city, could not, by
thereafter withdrawing their names, deprive the board of
directors of the city of jurisdiction, where, after the petition
was filed, all of the electors requested withdrawal of their
signatures and the city council took no action to place the
matter of annexation on the ballot, as required by law, and
upon suit of Rogers, the Supreme Court held that the City
Council had a duty to proceed with the ballot in that the
withdrawal of the names could not defeat the jurisdiction of
that body. 218 Cal. 221, 22 P.2d 509.
The Utah Courts do not appear to have passed on the
question of withdrawing names from a petition for annexation but have considered the problem of withdrawal of names
from petitions in the following cases. Halgren vs. Welling, 91
Utah 16, 63 P.2d 550, cited by appellants where writs of mandate and prohibition were requested against the Secretary
of State in connection with an initiative and referendum,
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wherein the statute required the petitions for initiative or
referendum, when signed and verified, to be delivered to the
county clerk who was to check the names and file the same
with his notation with the Secretary of State. After the petitions were filed by the respective clerks with the Secretary
of State but before any action was taken by the Secretary
of State to determine the sufficiency thereof, there was a
petition filed withdrawing 9,092 names and the majority of
the court held that the withdrawal was timely, since no
action had been taken by the Secretary of State. The dissent
of Justice Wolfe contended that no withdrawal should be
permitted after the county clerk received the petitions. However, the majority of the court did say, and cited other
cases which hold, that the weight of authority is that the
withdrawal may be made at any time before the petition has
been acted upon, citing Salt Lake and Utah RR Company vs.
Payson City, 66 Utah 521, 244 p. 138, which said that it was
proper for a person to withdraw his protest against a special
improvement so long as the withdrawal was made in the
time in which protests could be received and indicates that
the jurisdiction of the city to proceed with the improvement
or not to proceed is dependent upon the state of the record
at the time that the city acquires jurisdiction. The Payson
case cites Armstrong vs. Ogden City, 12 Utah 476, 43 p.119,
which held that a protestant cannot withdraw his protest
so as to vest jurisdiction in the city to make the improvement
after a sufficient number of owners have protested to defeat
the jurisdiction, so as to reinvest the city with jurisdiction to
make the improvement. It would appear, by these decisions,
that once the city had acquired jurisdiction, then no withdrawal would be effective.
Assuming an analogy between the Utah cases just considered and the instant annexation case, it would appear that
such time as a majority of owners petitions for annexation
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and the petition was filed with their recorder, as required
by law, jurisdiction was then vested in the city to determine
the matter at its next meeting. The attempted withdrawal of
names by the 26 persons came after the matter was called
for consideration by the council and was presented directly
to the council and not filed with the recorder. It would
appear that at the time the council commenced to consider
the petition, any attempt to withdraw the names was
untimely.
The cases referring to initiative and referendum are not
a good comparison for the reason that such petitions only require five percent or ten percent of the electorate to petition
to place an item on the ballot for further election and balloting. This is in contrast to a petition for annexation which
must contain a majority and calls for no further action by
the petitioners and only requires action from the body being
petitioned. The statute as worded for annexations makes it
entirely proper for a majority to file a petition with the city
recorder at the close of business on the day in which the
council is to meet and the council that very evening is required to take up the matter. It would seem that so far as the
petitioners are concerned, once they have filed the petition
with the city recorder and the city recorder has referred the
matter to the city council for its determination there cannot
be a withdrawal of a few names which frustrate jurisdiction
and this should be so, more particularly, where there are a
great number of persons signing the petition. The appellants
refer to an analogy in a civil action where the plaintiff has
right to withdraw or dismiss a complaint; however, they lose
sight of the fact that where there are many plaintiffs it requires consent of all for a voluntary dismissal, and the withdrawal of one or more does not dismiss as to all and the court
retains jurisdiction; furthermore, the court would not allow
the withdrawal by some of the plaintiffs where such with-
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drawal would substantially affect the rights of the other
plaintiffs remaining or would oust the court from jurisdiction. In the cases of disconnection where a petition is filed
by a majority of property owners with the clerk of the district court, it has been held that the court does not acquire
jurisdiction until a majority has filed, and this majority cannot be made-up by subsequent intervenors, although intervenors are allowed after a majority has first filed. Hence,
in Howard v. North Salt Lake (1955) 3 Utah 2d 189, the
Supreme Court held that there was no jurisdiction where the
petition filed with the clerk did not contain a majority of real
property owners in the area desired to be disconnected. Assuming that a majority had filed with the Clerk and the
court thus acquires jurisdiction, can a few withdraw to oust
the court of jurisdiction? Cases from other states do not
allow a withdrawal once the court has acquired jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, the petition for annexation should not be
made analogous to any other proceeding other than an annexation proceeding because it is different by its very nature
and most courts have held that there is no right to withdraw
a petition for annexation. The annotation in 27 A.L.R. 2d 604
at page 608 states as follows:
"In California it is held, apparently as an invariable
rule, that after a petition or remonstrance has been
filed with the proper public officer or body, a signer
cannot withdraw his signature".
POINT IV.
THE COUNCIL MEETING OF DECEMBER 14,
WAS INF ACT A REGULAR MEETING.
At the council meeting on December 7, 1966, the council,
at the suggestion of the mayor, agreed to meet on December
14, 1966, to consider an audit report and other matters
(R-16), and by separate resolution, unanimously adopted by
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the council, the proposition of annexation of this subject
area was to be considered at the December 14 meeting
(R18). Subsequently, the word "special" in reference to the
December 14, 1966, meeting, was stricken by council resolution to conform to the facts (R-25). Four of the plaintiffs
were present and all of the plaintiffs were informed of the
meeting scheduled for December 14, 1966, and all were represented by counsel at said meeting. The pertinent statute
and the city ordinance relative to meetings of the city council
are 10-6-19 Utah Code Annotated and 2-3-2 Revised Ordinances of Bountiful, as follows:
10-6-19. City council meetings - Call of special
meetings.-The city council in cities of the third
class shall prescribe the time and place of holding its
meetings; provided, that at least one meeting shall
be held each month, and the mayor or any two members of the council may call a special meeting by giving notice of it to each of the members of the council,
served personally or left at his usual place of abode.
Section 2-3-2 CITY COUNCIL l\IEETINGS, REGULAR AND SPECIAL
The City Council shall by resolution prescribe the
frequency, time and place of meetings of the City
Council; provided, that at least one meeting shall
be held each month. In the absence of other provision
therefor by resolution, if a meeting day falls on a
legal holiday, the regular meeting shall be held on
the next business day following, and adjourned meetings shall be held from time to time as circumstances
may require. The Mayor or any two Councilmen may
call special meetings by issuing a written notice to
such Members thereof, served personally or left at
his usual place of residence, and no business shall be
transacted at any special meeting except that stated
in the call thereof, unless all Councilmen are present
and unanimously consent thereto. (10-6-19) (R12)
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By said statute and ordinance, special meetings are called by
the mayor or any two members of the council by notice as
distinguished from meetings provided by resolution of the
council itself. The council had not theretofore by resolution
prescribed the time and place of holding its meetings (Rl2).
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, Volume 4, page 450 to
453, states that if a meeting is otherwise regular, it is all
right to schedule other meetings than those set forth in
formal ordinances or resolutions for "regular" meetings. The
text also quotes from a New Jersey case that "a stated meeting is one appointed by the council". State vs. Jersey City,
25 N.J.L. 311.
The apparent reason for the statutory requirement that
the petition for annexation be voted upon at the next regular meeting is to avoid a delay. It does not appear that the
provision was for the purpose of giving notice and opportunity to be heard because, in fact, there is no provision for
notice to either the persons signing the petition or those not
signing. Those who have signed the petition should not
object to an early decision on their petition, and those who
have not signed, being the minority, are not mentioned in the
statute as having any right of notice or opportunity to be
heard. However, in the instant case the complaining parties
were all adequately notified and actual notice with opportunity to be heard should preclude a challenge as to whether
or not this meeting were special or regular.
POINT V.
WHETHER THE DESCRIPTION OF THE ENTIRE
ANNEXED TERRITORY WAS, OR NEEDED TO
BE, ATTACHED TO THE PETITION BEFORE
FILING.
10-3-1 U.C.A. 1953, as amended, 1957 does not require
that the plat accompany the petition which is circulated for
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signature but merely requires that when the petition, in
writing, signed by majority, is filed, a plat or map, made
under the supervision of the city engineer, shall be filed in
the office of the recorder. The statute provides "they shall
cause an accurate plat or map of such territory to be made",
but does not require that the map be circulated with the
petition.
It is sufficiently clear that all of the protestants and all
persons who signed the petition were aware that their tracts
would be included in the proposed annexation.
POINT VI.
THE CITY COUNCIL HAS LEGISLATIVE DISCRETION TO DETERMINE THE EXISTENCE OF
AN EMERGENCY TO JUSTIFY SHORTENING
THE TIME OF EFFECTIVE DATE OF AN ANNEXATION ORDINANCE.

Bountiful was faced with the deadline of having the
annexation complete and the plat recorded before January 1,
1967, in order to have the tax rolls reflect that the annexed
property was within its boundaries for purposes of personal
property taxation. Faced \vith the necessity of supplying
services beginning January 1, 1967, the council was entitled
to protect its source of revenue.
10-6-12 Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides that ordinances shall go into effect on the 20th day after publication
or the 30th day after final passage, except that measures
necessary for the immediate preservation of peace, health or
safety of the municipality may, if so provided in the ordinance, take effect at an earlier date.
That an annexation may be the subject of an emergency
measure is implied in the decision of Burton vs. City of
Tucson, 88 Ariz. 320, 356 P.2d 413, where the ordinance was
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enacted as an emergency measure, and as such was not published nor required to be published if determined to be an
emergency measure, and the court held that it became effective upon passage before 30 days without publication, as an
emergency measure; hence, a citizen was not allowed to
attack the annexation ordinance after the same was complete, having become effective upon its passage without
publication.
The case of Fladung vs. City of Boulder, Colorado
(1966), 417 P.2d 787, held that where an ordinance creating
an improvement district provided that it shall take effect
upon passage as an emergency measure, it was not subject
to attack by suit. The court held that this could not be an
issue in that it had been decided many times that the recital
"necessary for the immediate preservation of the public
peace, health or safety" is a legislative and not a judicial
question.
Another Colorado case, Western Heights Land Corp. vs.
City of Fort Collins, 362 P.2d 155, held that the failure to
state facts of an emergency in an ordinance does not of itself
render the ordinance void and in such event, the effective
date, only, is postponed.
An Oregon case, Greenberg vs. Lee, 196 Or. 157, 248
P.2d 324, held that where the city council enacts an emergency ordinance pursuant to City Charter, the wisdom or
expediency of the council's determination of the existence
of an emergency, is not subject to judicial review, and the
legislative finding on the necessity of the emergency is conclusive on the courts.
A rule of construction assisting the determination of
whether the time element is mandatory or directory is stated
in Sjostrom v. Bishop, 15 Utah 2d 373 at page 377:
"The general rule is that a statute, prescribing the
time within which public officers are required to per·
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form an official act, is directory only, unless it contains negative words denying the exercise of the
power after the time specified or the nature of the
act to be performed, or the language used by the
legislature shows that the designation of time was intended as a limitation."
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the appellants had no

standing to challenge the validity of the annexation ordinance and even assuming the right to challenge, after there
is a determination that the city council had reasonably concluded that a majority of owners had executed the petition
and pursued it to enact an annexation ordinance no other
incidental or collateral matters connected with the proceedings may be considered after the effective date of the ordinance.
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

~~/?~
George K. Fadel
170 West 4th South
Bountiful, Utah

Attorney for Defendant-Respondent
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